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Elasticity of Supply to the Firm and the Business Cycle
* 
 
A body of recent empirical work has found strong evidence that the labor elasticity of supply 
to the firm is finite, implying that firms may have wage setting power. However, these studies 
capture only snapshots of the parameter. We study this parameter over a period that 
provides substantial variation in the business cycle. Using a rich employee level dataset from 
the inter-war period, we are able to estimate the elasticity of supply to the firm during several 
recessions and expansions. Our analysis suggests that the elasticity is indeed lower during 
recessions, consistent with the comparative statics from the Burdett-Mortensen search 
model. This differential wage setting power over the business cycle provides an alternative 
explanation of the pro-cyclicality of wages. 
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One of the most important, yet understudied, parameters of the labor market is the elasticity of
labor supply to the rm. A nite elasticity of supply may contradict the classic assumption that
rms have no wage setting power. If rms face no other constraints in setting wages, the nite
elasticity will drive a wedge between a worker's wage and her marginal revenue product. Manning
(2003) posits that labor market frictions imply that a model with upward sloping supply curves to
the rm, as rst described by Robinson (1933), best represents the labor market.1 Ultimately, the
value of the elasticity of supply to the rm is an empirical question. A small but quickly growing
literature has attempted to estimate this parameter.2
All previous work has captured only snapshots of this elasticity. Our primary contribution is
to study how this elasticity varies over the business cycle. We show that the Burdett-Mortensen
search model predicts pro-cyclicality in the elasticity of supply to the rm. This implies that rms
may have more wage setting power during recessions than during expansions. This is consistent
with empirical evidence of the pro-cyclicality of wages, but provides a dierent theoretical basis
than has been oered in the past: dierential wage setting ability over the business cycle.
To test for the cyclicality of this parameter, we employ a rich dataset of employee records from
the Ford Motor Company for the inter-war years of 1919 through 1940 (Whatley and Wright 1995).
From this data, Whatley and Sedo (1998) and Foote, Whatley and Wright (2003) suggest that
Ford may have enjoyed monopsony power during this period, but do not estimate the supply elas-
ticity directly. This data covers ve NBER dened contractions and six NBER dened expansions
(Committee 2011). The highly volatile labor market during this period provides us with the vari-
ation needed in the business cycle to identify the cyclicality of the elasticity of supply to the rm.
No other twenty year period provides us with the same frequency and degree of business cycle
variation. Our primary nding is that the elasticity of supply to the rm, never more than six in
1For a more detailed summary of monopsonistic labor markets see Ransom (1993) and Boal and Ransom (1997)
2See Boal (1995), Ransom and Oaxaca (2005), Ransom and Oaxaca (2010), Hirsch, Shank and Schnabel (2006),
Hirsch (2007), Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2009), Ransom and Sims (2009), Ransom and Lambson (2011), Hirsch,
Shank and Schnabel (2010), Falch (2010), and Falch (2011). Many of these estimates are in the range of 1 to 3.
Dube, Lester and Reich (2011) estimate structural parameters of the Burdett-Mortensen search model using reduced
form supply elasticities resulting from exogenous variation in minimum wages and nd estimates in the 4 to 10 range.
Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs (2010) use an exogenous wage change and nd a short-run elasticity of supply of 0.1.
2any period, drops by around half in a recession. Lack of an instrumental variable likely biases our
point estimates of the elasticity downward. However, we show that we are likely underestimating
the cyclicality of the elasticity as estimates are more biased during periods of economic growth
than during periods of contraction, thus strengthening our results regarding the cyclicality of the
parameter.
Our work also contributes to the literature on the identication of the labor elasticity of supply
to the rm. First, our identication strategy extends the standard methodology by relaxing the
assumption that the rm replaces all separations with recruits. This strategy is necessary because
our study involves a long period of time involving large 
uctuations in employment. It will also
prove useful as a more robust estimation strategy for future researchers. Second, our rich-rm level
data allows our empirical analysis to more closely follow the theoretical model than prior studies.
Specically, we document that a downward bias occurs when separation elasticities are calculated
using both voluntary and involuntary separations, as has been done in the past.
32 Model and Empirical Strategy
We extend the standard model used to estimate labor supply elasticities to the rm to take into
account 
uctuations in the business cycle. Our extension is applicable for rms that are expand-
ing or contracting employment. This allows us to credibly estimate how Lw changes over the
business cycle. We also present a simplied Burdett and Mortensen (1998) search model that pro-
vides the theoretical foundation for the dynamic monopsony setting. We derive predictions of how
macroeconomic shocks cause changes in Lw through changes in the structural parameters of the
model.
2.1 Estimating Labor Elasticity of Supply to the Firm
Manning's (2003) dynamic model of monopsony provides the foundation for the estimation approach
used in this paper. The model makes use of an assumption of a steady state in employment and an
insight from Card and Krueger (1995) which provides a method for obtaining the long-run supply
elasticities to the rm. From Card and Krueger (1995) the elasticity of supply to the rm is
Lw = R   s; (1)
where R is the recruitment elasticity and s is the separation elasticity. When a rm is neither
expanding nor contracting in employment, i.e. employment is in a steady state, Manning (2003)
shows that s =  R. This identity is derived from the fact that workers in the same labor market
face a similar job oer arrival rate, , and wage oer distribution, F(). One can then simply apply
the identity from Card and Krueger (1995) to show that Lw =  2s. This identity has been used
in most previous work measuring Lw, because separations are much easier to observe in data than
are recruits. Thus, other studies implement a strategy estimating s and then calculating Lw as -2
times s.
As the goal of this paper is to understand how the labor elasticity of supply to the rm, Lw,
varies over the business cycle, we must consider how to calculate Lw when the rm's employment
levels are not constant. To the best of our knowledge, prior work has not developed an estimation
4strategy robust to growth or contraction in employment at the rm.
We nd that the generalized relationship between Lw and s is
Lw =  (1 + 
)s
s(w)




 is the inverse employment growth rate during the period and s(w) is the separation rate.
Note that when 
 = 1, the elasticity of labor supply to the rm, Lw, is simply equal to the result
given above: Lw =  2sw. The derivation of equation 2 is found in the appendix.
It is easy to see that if 
 6= 1, an incorrect assumption of constant employment between time
periods will generate a biased result. If the rm is expanding (
 < 1), Lw will be overestimated,
and if the rm is contracting (
 > 1), Lw will be underestimated. This is important as we study
how Lw changes over the business cycle so that we do not over estimate the elasticity during
expansion and under estimate it during contraction.
2.2 Pro-cyclicality in the Labor Elasticity of Supply to the Firm
Here we show how changes in two key structural parameters of the Burdett-Mortensen search model
(the job oer arrival rate and the job destruction rate) aect the elasticity of supply to the rm. As
would be expected, a higher rate of job arrivals and a lower rate of job destruction decrease frictions
in the labor market and decrease attachment to a particular rm. In sum, the Burdett-Mortensen
search model tells us that s will be counter-cyclical and thus Lw will be pro-cyclical.
In the Burdett-Mortensen model, the separation rate of employees at a rm, s(w), is dened by
s(w) =  + [1   F(w)]; (3)
where  is the job destruction rate, or the rate at which employed workers exit the rm for non-
employment,  is the job oer arrival rate, and F(w) is the probability that a wage oer dominates






 + [1   F(w)]
: (4)
5During an economic downturn, we would expect  to increase3 and  to decrease. The reverse











( + [1   F(w)])2  0: (5)
Thus, in an economic expansion as  decreases and  increases, the elasticity of separation (s)
decreases towards negative innity, and the elasticity of labor supply to the rm (Lw) increases
towards positive innity as the two elasticities are negatively related. In an economic downturn, as
 increases and  decreases, the elasticity of separation and supply both approach zero. These two
predictions are consistent with the literature that real wages are pro-cyclical, as a standard prot




3The data documents this as  is at its largest during the years 1930-1933 as the economy sank into the depths of
the Great Depression. Also, Figure 4 shows how  increases during contractions at Ford Motors.
63 Data
The data for this paper is extracted from a larger dataset covering a sample of employee records
at Ford Motors from 1918 to 1947. The data's principal investigators, Warren Whatley and Gavin
Wright, obtained employee work history through random sampling of archived records (Whatley
and Wright 1995). Maloney and Whatley (1995) begin to convey the idea that Ford Motors may
have had potential monopsony power over its workers. Later work by Whatley and Sedo (1998)
studies the quit behavior of workers at Ford Motors. Although the labor supply parameters that
are the focus of our paper are not estimated, their work did recognize potential monopsony power.
They state that, \the additional monopsony power that employers have over black workers results
in poorer job matches for black workers and lower reservation utilities. A lower reservation utility
reduces job search and the propensity to quit." Foote et al. (2003) extends the work of Whatley
and Sedo (1998) and also suggests the existence of monopsony power.
The data was obtained in such a way that only workers who had separated from Ford Motors
by 1947 were intended to be included in the sample. Therefore, observations of workers with hire
dates closer to 1947 are fundamentally dierent from those in earlier time periods. Observations
for these workers had shorter tenure spans by construction of the sample. We limit our sample to
pre-1941 data not only because of this sample selection bias, but also because Ford Motors became
unionized in 1941 and the industrial landscape began to change due to the war. Observations from
1918 may have also been aected by policies related to World War I and are thus also omitted.
Each worker in the original sample is identied by a unique ID. When a job characteristic such
as wage or job position changes, a new job record was recorded. Included in the job record is a
variable that indicates when the job ended and whether the person moved internally in the rm,
such as to a new position or even a new wage, or whether the move was external through quitting,
being red, being laid-o, military leave, etc.
In order to estimate the labor elasticity of supply to the rm, we needed the data to be structured
into equal length periods. We follow an estimation approach similar to Ransom and Oaxaca (2010),
who used year-end payroll data of a rm. We use the original Ford Motor employee data to
create semi-annual observations of employment status, wages, and tenure. We chose semi-annual
7observations rather than annual observations because the average time between a wage change for
an employee was typically between ve to six months, as reported in Table 2.4 Having ner time
periods also allows us to more precisely estimate the cyclicality of the labor elasticity of supply to
the rm.
The employee records provided the specic job title of each employee. However, these job titles
were not systematically organized. To capture the causal eect of wages on separation, one needs
to control for jobs or tasks that may be correlated with wages and that also aect an employee's
decision to separate from the rm, for example, compensating wage dierentials for working in
undesirable jobs. We use the job titles from the data to create job-specic indicator variables. We
found the most commonly used words to describe a job position and matched it with a corresponding
indicator variable.5
Summary statistics for the Ford data are given in Table 1. Each observation in the table
is a semi-annual worker observation as used in the analysis section. Table 2 provides detailed
information on separations and nominal wage changes at Ford. Involuntary separations were not
a trivial share of total separations in any time period. The number of nominal wage changes was
dominated by upward changes. However, there were downward changes in wages in each period.
From the second of 1929 through the rst half of 1933, 35% of wage changes were downward.
We also obtained average and peak employment data from Ford's archive to calculate year
to year growth rates during this period(Archives 1903-1972). Data on growth rates is needed to
correctly adjust the elasticities when a rm's employment levels are not constant over time. Figure
1 shows both average and peak employment over the period of study.
4There is no consensus in the literature on the frequency of data to be used. Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) use
yearly observations while Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2009) use monthly observations. Intuitively, the length of
time used should coincide with the employees' decisions to separate. Since we are interested in how wages aect
separation decisions it seems appropriate to equate the length of the time period to the average time between wage
changes. Also, as we are interested in changes in the parameter over the business cycle, our nal results should be
invariant to specication choices uniformly aecting the level of the parameter in dierent time periods, as a dierent
choice of time frame may do.
5We chose to aggregate to the following ten job titles: assembly, operator, laborer, maker, gdr, trade, hand, upper,
missing, and other. The \trade" job title refers to jobs such as welding and electrician. The title \hand" refers to
jobs such as machine hand or press hand. \Upper" workers are in reference to clerks, inspectors, and foreman. The
abbreviation \gdr" is unknown but commonly used.
84 Estimation Strategy and Identication
As shown previously, the elasticity of labor supply to a rm can be identied through the elasticity
of separation. Between the years 1919-1940, Ford Motors was often expanding or contracting in
employment. Manning's (2003) assumption that the rm's employment level is in a steady state
can be relaxed if one knows the growth rates of the rm over the time period and applies the
methods in Section 2. Here we explain how we will estimate the separation elasticities and then
solve for the labor elasticity of supply to Ford Motors.
4.1 Estimation Strategy
We use a linear probability model (LPM) to estimate the elasticity of separation with respect to
wage,6
si = 0 + 1 ln(wi) + XiB + i; (6)
where si is the binary variable indicating that individual i separated from their job at Ford Motors
by voluntarily quitting. wi is the wage of individual i and the vector Xi represents other observable
variables for each individual that aect the separation decision. Included in Xi are age, job tenure,
age and job tenure squared, race, marital status, job, plant, and year xed eects. i is a vector of
unobserved variables.
We estimate four specications of the LPM. The rst specication excludes all controls except
for year xed eects which control for the price level. The second specication adds the individual
level control covariates into the model. Controlling for actual experience at Ford is important, as
we are trying to isolate the eect of wages on the decision to separate. Without controlling for this
the true eect of wages on separation is confounded by more tenured workers receiving higher wages
and being more attached to the rm because of other reasons. The third and fourth specications
add plant and job title xed eects, respectively. Plant xed eects control for working conditions,
which varied across plants (Foote et al. 2003). The job titles are used to control for unobserved
6We also estimated the elasticities with a Probit model and found similar results. The choice to use the LPM over
the Probit model mainly resulted from the ease in bootstrapping the standard errors. The Probit specication is
much more sensitive than the LPM specication when bootstrapping over smaller samples. However, point estimates
and statistical signicance were similar between the two models when there was a relatively large sample.
9tasks that were required of workers. Controlling for job titles and race is important in light of the
evidence in Foote et al. (2003) showing that black workers were often placed into more dangerous
and less desirable jobs than white workers.
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i ^ s;i, then applying equation 2 from Section 2.
Figure 1 shows the trends in average and peak employment at Ford Motors over our period of
study.7 Period specic 
's were obtained from the year level data seen in the gure. From 1919
through 1929 employment, for the most part, steadily increased; this is consistent with the general
growth of the U.S. economy. Ford Motors experienced a large-scale contraction along with the U.S.
economy between 1929 and 1933. Growth once again picked up in 1933.
Given these dierent economic conditions over the time period of study, we begin our analysis
of the variation in Lw by estimating the value of the parameter for each of the following three
major sub-periods: 1) 1919 through the rst half of 1929 (\The Roaring Twenties"), 2) the end of
1929 through the rst half of 1933 (\The Great Contraction"), and 3) the period from the second
half of 1933 through 1940 (\The New Deal").
We next turn our attention to the NBER dened expansions and contractions during our period
of study. No other 22-year period in the United States during the 20th century observed such large
and frequent 
uctuations in the business cycle. We partition the data into 11 sub-periods for each
expansion (6) and contraction (5) in the period of study. We then estimate the elasticity of supply
to the rm for each sub-period.
4.2 Identication
Causal identication of the elasticity of separation is the rst step in the identication of Lw.
To consistently identify the elasticity of separation, we must have variation in wages which is
7The data was obtained from the Ford Motor archives through personal request (Archives 1903-1972).
10independent from other unobserved factors that aect the probability of separating. Our wage
variation comes from dierent workers being paid dierent wages after conditioning on job title,
plant location, year, tenure, and other demographic information. Even with this rich set of controls,
we acknowledge the potential for omitted variable bias. Below we discuss the instrumental variable
approaches that have been undertaken by a small number of papers in this literature, then we
attempt to sign the bias that may aect our estimates.
Ransom and Sims (2009) is able to identify the elasticity of separation by instrumenting actual
salaries with pre-negotiated salaries for school teachers. Similarly, Falch (2011) was able to exploit
an exogenous wage change for a subset of school teachers. Ransom and Sims (2009) nds that
without instrumental variables, the elasticity of separation is biased upward and as a result the
labor elasticity of supply to the rm is biased downward. Other recent papers in this literature
that have analyzed private sector data, like ours, have not been able to nd a valid instrument to
overcome endogeneity issues.8
Following the linear specication described above, suppose i can be decomposed as yi + i.
Therefore, the equation of interest is,
si = 0 + 1 ln(wi) + Xi2 + yi + i; (8)
where yi represents an unobserved variable that is correlated with ln(wi) and i represents a vector
of unobserved characteristics such that E[ijln(wi);Xi;yi] = 0. As long as  6= 0, the parameter of
interest, 1 cannot be estimated consistently:
plim ^ 1 = 1 + ; (9)
where  is the coecient on ln(w) in the population regression of the omitted variable, y, on ln(w)
8To properly instrument for wages we need an instrument that is correlated with wages, does not directly aect
separation decisions, and varies across individual employees. An ideal instrument would be a mechanism that ran-
domly assigns wages to individual employees. Uncovering such an instrument in this context is dicult to imagine.
Dube et al. (2011) is able to account for interactions among rms and workers in their estimation. Such equilib-
rium eects are important as identication comes through changes in the minimum wage which in turn aects the
wage distribution of all rms. Our identication comes through variation in wages at Ford alone. However, outside
rm-employee interactions are still a concern as we describe later in the section.
11and X.
The potential endogeneity issue that arises in our study is the concern that outside labor demand
shocks, yi, faced by individual i are positively correlated with wages after controlling for individual
characteristics as well as year, plant and job title xed eects.9 Therefore,  is positive. Likewise,
 is believed to be positive as outside positive demand shocks for labor increase the job oer arrival
rate, , and the probability of separating from the rm. With  > 0, the estimated coecient
on ln(w), ^ 1, is biased in a positive direction. Therefore, s would also be biased in a positive
direction, which would cause Lw to be biased in a negative direction.
However, we expect that  is not constant over the business cycle. Specically, wages are
typically more sticky downward than upward. Table 2 shows wage changes at Ford Motors over
time. Although, we see variation in both directions, wages move upward more easily in periods
with high outside labor demand than they move downward during periods of low outside labor
demand. These movements suggest that the magnitude of the bias, , is not constant because
 is greater during times of economic expansion than during times of economic contraction. The
greater downward bias during expansions implies that our estimate of the dierence in the elasticity
between expansions and contractions will also be biased downwards. Thus we will underestimate
the pro-cyclicality of the elasticity of labor supply to the rm.
4.3 Estimation Bias from Involuntary Separations
The underlying idea in the search framework is that individuals voluntarily separate because they
accept a higher wage elsewhere (Manning 2003). Therefore, identication of Lw should come
from seeing how wages and voluntary separations covary. The data used in previous empirical
work has not specied the reason for separation, which creates measurement error problems. The
Ford employee data species whether the separation was a voluntary quit or a forced lay-o or
9We also experimented with including peer variables that may be correlated with log wages and plausibly correlated
with unobserved labor demand shocks. The three peer variables included in the estimation equation are the average
wage of workers with the same tenure, workers in the same job title, and workers in the same plant. It is possible
that individuals make wage comparisons between themselves and their peers when determining quitting decisions.
However, the key idea behind the peer variables is to proxy for labor demand shocks at the individual level in order
to minimize the endogeneity of wages. However, the estimated results were robust to the inclusion of these peer
variables.
12ring. Therefore, we are in the position to eliminate and assess the potential bias due to the
misclassication of reasons for separating.
The bias is not straightforwardly signed when both voluntary and involuntary separations are
used to estimate population parameter on ln(w), . In the extreme case, suppose that involuntary
separations, s0
i, are orthogonal to log wages. Therefore, the estimate of , using both voluntary and
involuntary separations, is biased towards zero as it is a weighted average of zero and . However,
it is not clear that log wages are orthogonal to involuntary separations. One possibility is that
log wages and involuntary separations are negatively correlated even after controlling for Xi. We
address the direction of this bias empirically in the next section by comparing point estimates of
the elasticity of supply to the rm under inclusion and exclusion of involuntary quits. Furthermore,
we separately analyze the correlation between wages and res and layos.
135 Results and Discussion
5.1 Main Results
Results from a set of linear probability model estimations using all years of data are presented
in Table 3. In each estimation, we nd a negative and statistically signicant coecient on log
wage. The relatively small magnitudes of these coecients suggest that a nite elasticity of labor
supply to the rm is expected. The rst specication includes only year xed eects. In the second
specication, we control for individual covariates. The linear tenure term is always negative and
signicant, while age is positively correlated with separations. Marital status has a marginally
signicant and positive eect on separations. The coecient on an indicator variable for African-
American workers is negative and always signicant (consistent with Foote et al. (2003)). The
third and fourth specications include additional xed eects for the plant at which the worker was
employed and the worker's job title, respectively. The results are similar to the second specication
and suggest robustness in our results after conditioning on key demographic variables.
In Table 4, we report the labor elasticity of supply to the rm (Lw) from the estimation strategy
outlined in Section 2 and 4, which incorporates 
. The standard errors on the elasticity estimates
are obtained by bootstrapping with 500 replications.10 Estimates of the elasticity obtained from
pooling all years range from 3.03 to 3.88. The estimates from three major sub-periods are also
reported in Table 4.11 Across all four specications we note a similar pattern. First, the estimate
of the labor elasticity of supply to the rm in The Roaring Twenties is similar in magnitude to the
estimate in the pooled sample (because a large fraction of observations come from those years).
Second, the estimate of the labor supply elasticity falls sharply during the Great Contraction. This
result is consistent with the nding of Bresnahan and Ra (1991), that show from the peak of
1929 to the trough of 1933, half of the U.S. auto plants shut down while only one third of U.S.
10To obtain the bootstrapped standard errors, we used the bootstrapping package provided by Stata. This package
called a program from which an LMP was run and the supply elasticity was calculated post-estimation. We then found
the standard deviation of the distribution of all 500 estimates of the elasticity provided, including from estimates
in which not all parameters or their standard could be estimated. We presume that some parameters could not be
estimated in every bootstrapped sub-sample on account of the high number of xed eects in the full model combined
with the relatively small sample size in some of the sub-periods.
11In the appendix we report the estimates of the linear probability model run for the preferred fourth specication
for each of the three major sub-periods. The full set of results is available upon request from the authors.
14manufacturing establishments were closed. Therefore, job specic capital that Ford workers had
would have been relatively less demanded. Thus, the decrease in the elasticity of supply is due to this
decrease in the job oer arrival rate (). None of our point estimates from The Great Contraction
are signicantly dierent from 0, thus we cannot reject a null hypothesis of perfectly inelastic
labor supply to the rm during this period.12 Finally, during the recovery period beginning after
1933, the labor supply elasticity increases to levels comparable to those of the Roaring Twenties.
Elasticities during the New Deal were slightly higher than during the Roaring Twenties, suggestive
of the eects of various changes to the labor market enacted during the New Deal.13
The results in Table 4 are prima facia evidence of the pro-cyclicality of the elasticity of labor
supply to the rm: the elasticity plummeted as the country sank into the Great Depression, and
then increased in value as the economy began to recover. We now further examine this relationship
using ner sub-periods in time from our data. First, in Figure 2 we present estimates of the
elasticity obtained from pooling data into three period windows.14 The gure also plots the national
unemployment rate.15 We see more evidence consistent with pro-cyclicality of the elasticity: the
large increase in unemployment beginning after 1929 is consistent with the plummeting elasticities
during this period. While the persistently high unemployment of the mid 1930s is not consistent
with the increasing elasticity during the same time, we do see the unemployment rate start to
decrease in 1934, around the time the elasticity of supply starts to increase.
12While we would expect that the economic conditions during this period would create very inelastic labor supply,
we also believe that our estimates tend to be biased downwards for reasons as noted previously. Ransom and
Sims (2009) nd that estimates of the elasticity of supply to the rm are biased downward prior to implementing
instrumental variables. This is consistent with Falch (2010) who nds downward bias through omitted variables.
13The Wagner Act of 1935 expanded employee collective bargaining rights and resultantly union membership rose.
While Ford did not unionize until 1941, General Motors and Chrysler unionized during the mid 1930s. As union
contracts increased wages signicantly (we see this in our data from Ford when comparing 1940 and 1941), this likely
shifted the wage oer distribution to the right for Ford workers (as GM and Chrysler's wages increased more quickly
than Ford's.) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 set a national minimum wage and overtime requirements. The
Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Civil Works Administration, and the Works Progress Administration,
all created in the New Deal era, oered government sponsored work relief on a large scale. These would have the
eect of increasing the job arrival rate during this period. Social insurance programs were created through the Social
Security Act of 1935. Such reform likely impacted the reservation wage of workers. See Fishback (2008) for a more
detailed summary of New Deal policies.
14To make the scale of the gure more concise, we bound the elasticity at its theoretical lower bound of 0. The
approximate values of the parameter not shown above are as follows for each window centered around the given year:
1931(I) is -3.7, 1931(II) is -6.7, 1932(I) is -4.9, 1932(II) is -6.0, 1933(I) is -1.2.
15Source of unemployment data is drawn from Romer (1986) and Coen (1973) as compiled by at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User talk:Peace01234 .
15A cleaner test for the pro-cyclicality of the elasticity requires a sharper denition of the state of
the economy. Therefore, we turn to NBER business cycle data that denes peak and trough dates
of the business cycles throughout the 1920s and 1930s in order to directly test whether recessions
decrease the labor elasticity of supply to the rm. Figure 3 presents the 11 NBER dened sub-
periods and the estimates of the labor elasticity of supply to the rm in each sub-period.16 Six
blue dots represent estimates obtained during periods of expansion, while ve red dots represent
estimates obtained during recessions. The size of each dot is proportional to the number of years
represented. With the exception of the rst recessionary sub-periods, we see that whenever the
economy fell into recession, our estimate of the elasticity was lower than in the expansions that
preceded and followed the recession.17 This data is also presented in Table 5. Arrows indicate the
direction of the economy in the period. Note that with the lower elasticities in recessionary periods
also come higher markdown rates.18
Finally, in Table 6 we present the results of tests for the pro-cyclicality of the elasticity of labor
supply to the rm using the data presented in Table 5 and Figure 3. We regress both the level of
the elasticity and changes in the elasticity on an indicator variable for a recessionary sub-period.
Additionally, we perform non-parametric tests of a null hypothesis that the estimated elasticities
during expansions and contractions resulted from the same data generating process.
We run three parametric regressions on each dependent variable; these dier according to re-
gression weights used. Regardless of the weights, all 6 regressions yield negative coecients varying
between -1.12 and -5.09, indicating the economic signicance of a recession on the elasticity of labor
supply to the rm. Our rst weighting strategy is to weight by the inverse of the standard error
on the point estimate of the elasticity in the sub-period. Thus, when using this weight, we put
more weight on periods for which we have a more precise estimate. Our second weighting strategy
is to weight proportionately to the number of years covered in each sub-period. This weight allows
the model to put more weight on longer expansions or contractions. This may be appropriate for
16We dene a semi-annual period as being part of an expansion/recession if more than half of the period was in an
NBER dened expansion/recession.
17We present this same gure with the supply elasticities calculated by multiplying the separation elasticity by
negative two in Appendix Figure 1. This evidence points more strongly towards pro-cyclicality of the parameter.
18The potential markdown is dened as
MRPL w
MRPL and was equated through the identity that the rate of potential
employee exploitation is equal to the inverse of Lw.
16two reasons. If we consider an observation to be a recession or an expansion, this weighting is not
necessary. But if we consider an observation to be a time period in a given economy, we should
put more weight on longer expansions and contractions than on shorter ones. Second, a recession
may require some persistence in order to aect the elasticity of supply to the rm. This weighting
strategy would capture the eects of persistence. Finally, we weight by the product of both of the
weights described above, addressing both of the issues discussed here simultaneously.
We nd negative but insignicant results when weighting by the inverse of the standard errors
for both of the dependent variables. However, when we weight by period length, we nd negative
results that are signicant at the 5% level for the elasticity level and 10% level for changes in
the elasticity. Finally, when weighting by the product of the two earlier weights, we nd negative
and marginally signicant results. Our non-parametric test is a Mann-Whitney \ranksum" test.
The null hypothesis is that elasticity estimates for both the recession and expansion periods were
generated by the same data generating process. We are able to reject the null at the 0:0001 level.
This rejection implies that the data generating process for recessionary periods produced lower
elasticities of supply.
Together, these results conrm the comparative statics derived from the Burrdett-Mortensen
model and presented in Section 3, namely that the labor elasticity of supply to the rm is pro-
cyclical. Potential downward estimation bias of the elasticity is larger during periods of economic
growth. Therefore, endogeneity issues bias us against nding a result.
5.2 Additional Estimation Issues
5.2.1 Employment Adjustment and Voluntary Quits
Here we address the importance of adjusting for changes in the employment level over time and
using only voluntary quits to estimate Lw. To examine the potential bias we 1) re-estimated the
model without adjusting for changes in the employment level and using only voluntary quits, and
2) re-estimated the model where we adjust for employment changes but include both voluntary
and involuntary separations in the analysis. The results in Table 8 are estimated from specication
four, which included individual controls as well as year, plant, and job title xed eects. Both
17types of specication error impact the estimates of Lw.
If the rm is expanding employment and we use the traditional approach of setting Lw =  2s
then the Lw is over-estimated. Similarly, if the rm's employment level is decreasing and we follow
the traditional approach, Lw will be under-estimated. This is conrmed with the results in Table 8,
which show that the Unadjusted estimate of Lw is above the Preferred estimate when employment
expanded. During the employment expansion of the Roaring 20s period the Unadjusted estimate
is 3.93, which is approximately 17% larger than the Preferred estimate of 3.36. Similarly, the New
Deal period shows an Unadjusted estimate of 5.53, which is approximately 18% larger than the
Preferred estimate of 4.70. Things are more complicated during the Great Depression period as the
estimates are negative (although not statistically dierent from zero) and therefore the adjustment
procedure is not valid.19
Table 2 shows the number of observed separations that are not voluntary. During the whole
period of study, involuntary separations accounted for around 20% of total separations. Notably,
layos and rings were an even larger share of total separations during the two periods in the Great
Depression. Figure 4 shows voluntary and involuntary separation rates over the period of study.
Voluntary separations appear to be pro-cyclical and involuntary separations appear to be counter-
cyclical. To further analyze the heterogeneity in separation behavior we present the results from
three regressions in Table 7. The specication is identical to the preferred specication described
above. However, the sample includes separations through res and lay-os instead of quits. The
rst column shows there is a negative relationship between log wages and involuntary separations,
but the magnitude is several times smaller than the main results from the preferred specication
in Table 3. The second and third column separately show the correlation between log wages and
res and quits, respectively. Log wages are negatively related with res at a statistically signicant
level, but not for lay-os.
The potential bias from including involuntary quits in the analysis can be found by comparing
the estimates from the column labeled \Invol Quits" in Table 8 to our preferred estimates. Adding
involuntary separations to voluntary quits leads to lower estimates of the labor elasticity of supply
19See Appendix Figure 1 for the eect of using the traditional approach over the NBER established business cycles.
18in all periods. Therefore, previous work that has identied Lw through all separations is likely to
have underestimated Lw if involuntary separations occurred with high frequency.
5.2.2 Eciency Wages at Ford Motors and Separation
Ford Motors is commonly cited as paying an eciency wage. Is an eciency wage during the
time period simply causing a lack of separations, thus driving the nite elasticities at the rm?
Ra (1986) and Ra and Summers (1987) establish that Ford did pay higher than market wages
around 1914. However, when one considers the entire labor market during our period of study, all
auto manufacturing rms were paying high wages. Rae (1965) nds that in the mid to late 1920s
auto companies were paying wages that were nearly 40% greater than rms in other manufacturing
industries. Using the 1940 U.S. Census (Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder and
Sobek 2010) and the Ford employee data from 1939 and 1940, we nd that Ford's wages were
17:6% higher than other durable good manufacturing wages in Michigan after controlling for age
and race. Work by Bresnahan and Ra (1991) also documents heterogeneity in rms that existed
during this period. If we believe that Ford competes primarily with other auto plants for employees,
we should then consider the entire labor market of auto workers.
Table 2 shows that in the time periods studied the semi-annual ratio of voluntary quits to non-
separations ranged from .13 during the Great Contraction to .35 during the Roaring 20s. Therefore,
although Ford may have been paying an eciency wage, the size of the eciency wage was not large
enough to stop high voluntary turnover. Importantly, the identication strategy relies on estimating
voluntary separations on log wages. Therefore, as long as there is sucient variation in log wages
and observed voluntary separations, one can estimate Lw. Furthermore, our focus is on how this
parameter changed over this period of time. So our results about the changes in the elasticity over
time should be informative, even if our point estimates from Ford are not representative of the
typical rm.
195.3 Potential Wage Mark Downs and Pro-cyclical Real Wages
A rm facing a nite elasticity of supply is able to pay a wage less than the marginal revenue
product of labor. Therefore, given the pro-cyclicality of the labor elasticity of supply, the negative
eects of a recession can mitigated through lower labor costs. Table 8 reports the potential wage
markdown and its 95% condence interval for the entire time period as well as the three major
sub-periods. We provide no evidence that Ford exploited the nite elastic labor supply and actually
paid workers less than their MRPL. The results suggest that during the Roaring 20s the potential
markdown on wages was 23% (wages potentially equated only 77% of MRPL). A perfectly inelastic
supply of labor to the rm during the Great Contraction suggests a potential 100% markdown of
wages. However, the upper-bound of the imprecise estimate suggests a potential markdown of only
27%. The expected New Deal period potential markdown was 18%.
The relationship between real wages and the business cycle has been studied in a number
of settings, including noncompetitive output markets and with price markups (Abraham and
Haltiwanger 1995). However, to our knowledge, the relationship has not been studied in a set-
ting with noncompetitive input markets, where rms can pay below the perfectly competitive wage
through nite Lw. A pro-cyclical Lw allows for rms to mark down wages during economic down-
turns and forces rms to pay more competitive wages during economic growth. Our results provide
an additional explanation for pro-cyclical real wages. Bils (1985) shows convincing evidence that
real wages are pro-cyclical by using disaggregated panel data. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) de-
velops a contract model to understand how labor market conditions aect real wages. Under the
condition that mobility between rms is costly (labor market frictions), the model predicts the
unemployment rate at the time of hire and the individual's entered into contract wage to be neg-
atively correlated. This is consistent with the monopsonistic outcome that labor market frictions
can grant rms the ability to pay workers less than their marginal revenue product of labor.
Solon, Whately and Stevens (1997) uses the Ford Motor Employee data set to try to explain that
empirical evidence suggests that real wages are pro-cyclical. While we focus on Lw as a potential
cause, they show that intra-rm mobility can also explain the pro-cyclicality of real wages for
individuals who do not separate from the rm.
206 Conclusion
Our study has for the rst time addressed both theoretical and empirical evidence that the labor
elasticity of supply to the rm is pro-cylical. Comparative statics on the Burdett-Mortensen search
model predict that the labor elasticity of supply to the rm should increase during economic
expansion and decrease during economic contraction. Examining data that allows us to identify
the relationship between the elasticity and the business cycle, we nd evidence that the elasticity is
lower during recessions than it is during expansions. Regressions that weight by the length of the
business cycles examined in our data allow us to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level that the
mean elasticity is the same during expansionary and contractionary periods. Non-parametric tests
unequivocally allow us to reject a null that elasticities in these two states of the economy come
from the same data generating process.
We also present two identication related contributions. First, we derive a generalized estima-
tion strategy that can be applied to data sets where the rm's employment level is not constant.
Second, we nd that the inclusion of involuntary separations in the estimation of the elasticity of
supply to the r can create signicant attenuation bias if there is a high frequency of involuntary
quits.
The elasticity of supply to the rm potentially plays a large role in how wages and employ-
ment levels are determined within labor markets. A pro-cyclical labor elasticity of supply to the
rm allows rms to mark down wages during economic contractions and forces rms to pay more
competitive wages during economic expansions. This is consistent with recent work establishing
that wages are pro-cyclical, but under the scope of a new mechanism. It also provides insight into
how reduced labor costs for a rm can mitigate potential economic losses during a recession. Our
research adds to a small but growing literature on the elasticity and furthers future work with its
methodological contributions.
21Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max N
1919(I)-1940(II)
Separations 0.222 0.416 0.000 1.000 6979
Wage 0.799 0.143 0.130 2.030 6979
Age 31.201 7.413 15.000 57.500 6967
Tenure 2.413 2.935 0.000 21.000 6967
Married 0.535 0.499 0.000 1.000 6967
Black 0.077 0.266 0.000 1.000 6967
1919(I)-1929(I)
Separations 0.257 0.437 0.000 1.000 5255
Wage 0.788 0.139 0.300 2.030 5255
Age 30.567 6.644 16.500 57.500 5243
Tenure 1.802 2.043 0.000 14.000 5243
Married 0.527 0.499 0.000 1.000 5243
Black 0.072 0.258 0.000 1.000 5243
1929(II)-1933(I)
Separations 0.113 0.317 0.000 1.000 820
Wage 0.878 0.169 0.130 1.630 820
Age 34.659 7.955 18.000 51.000 820
Tenure 4.273 3.438 0.000 14.500 820
Married 0.632 0.483 0.000 1.000 820
Black 0.066 0.248 0.000 1.000 820
1933(II)-1940(II)
Separations 0.123 0.328 0.000 1.000 904
Wage 0.797 0.119 0.250 1.150 904
Age 31.744 9.838 15.000 57.500 904
Tenure 4.268 4.769 0.000 21.000 904
Married 0.494 0.500 0.000 1.000 904
Black 0.115 0.319 0.000 1.000 904
22Table 2: Separations and Wage Changes at Ford
1919(I)-1940(II) 1919(I)-1929(I) 1929(II)-1933(I) 1933(II)-1940(II)
# Stays 5422 3902 727 793
# Quits 1545 1341 93 111
# Fires 193 163 20 10
# Layos 260 32 148 80
Wage  Per Worker 1.34 1.13 1.28 1.87
 Up 0.89 0.92 0.65 0.93
 Down 0.11 0.08 0.35 0.07






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 4: Elasticity Estimates Over Major Sub-Periods
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4
1919(I)-1940(II) 3.88 3.03 3.23 3.19
(0.31) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35)
1919(I)-1929(I) 4.15 3.20 3.41 3.36
(0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34)
1929(II)-1933(I) 1.04 -1.29 -0.61 -0.90
(1.43) (1.65) (1.73) (1.84)
1933(II)-1940(II) 4.54 4.30 4.63 4.70
(1.37) (1.39) (1.69) (1.70)
1 Bootstrap standard errors presented in parentheses from 500
replications.
Table 5: Business Cycle (NBER) Estimates
Start Year End Year BS Direction Elasticity of Supply Markdown Obs
1919(I) 1919(II) % 1.59 0.39 228
(2.05)
1920(I) 1921(I) & 5.00 0.17 410
(1.18)
1921(II) 1923(I) % 3.82 0.21 977
(0.68)
1923(II) 1924(I) & 2.98 0.25 711
(0.89)
1924(II) 1926(II) % 3.90 0.20 1692
(0.81)
1927(I) 1927(II) & 0.72 0.58 363
(2.69)
1928(I) 1929(I) % 3.28 0.23 862
(0.82)
1929(II) 1933(I) & -0.90 1.00 820
(1.85)
1933(II) 1937(I) % 5.49 0.15 504
(2.10)
1937(II) 1938(I) & 3.49 0.22 118
(8.86)
1938(II) 1940(II) % 4.61 0.18 282
(2.95)
a Bootstrap standard errors displayed in parentheses from 500 replications.
25Table 6: Parametric and Non-Parametric Test
1
SE # of Periods
# of Periods
SE Non-Parametric
 -1.120 -3.474 -2.816
Level p-value 0.340 0.043 0.126 .0001
Obs 11 11 11 44
 -1.831 -5.090 -3.473
Dierence p-value 0.351 0.055 0.190 .0001
obs 10 10 10 42
Table 7: LPM Estimates on Involuntary Quits
Fires and Layos Fires Layos
Log Wage -0.09 -0.08 -0.02
(0.024) (0.018) (0.019)
Black -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Age-Squared 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure-Squared 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
R-squared 0.112 0.040 0.181
N 5875 5615 5682
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34A Appendix
A.1 Elasticity of Supply to the Firm with Changes in Employment
In this section we derive the relationship between the elasticity of supply to the rm, Lw, and
the elasticity of separation to the rm, s, while relaxing the assumption that the rm is neither
expanding or contracting. By knowing the employment growth rate and separation rate at the rm,
we show a straightforward relationship between Lw and s. We begin by showing the relationship
derived by Manning (2003) which is only applicable when separations in the rm are replaced by
recruits. We then show our extension to the model which is more applicable when studying Lw
while employment at the rm is not constant.
Let s(w) represent the rate at which workers separate from the rm and R(w) represent the
number of new recruits (workers) that are employed at the rm in a given time period. Therefore,
if a rm has Lt 1 workers last period and pays wt this period, the rm's labor supply this period is
Lt = [1   s(wt)]Lt 1 + R(wt): (10)
If the rm's employment is constant, Lt = Lt 1, replacing Lt 1 for Lt in equation 10 and solving





By taking the log of each side and dierentiating with respect to w, the following equality holds:
Lw = R   s;
where R is the recruitment elasticity and s is the separation elasticity. Manning (2003) shows
that through the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) search model, s =  R. This relationship results
from separations and recruits having common job oer arrival rates and facing the same wage oer
distribution in the labor market. As separations are much easier to observe in data than recruits,
this result is extremely important in allowing researchers to estimate the Lw under the assumption
that the rm's employment is constant.
To study the Lw over a period of time it is more dicult to satisfy the assumption that a rm's
employment levels are constant. Therefore, multiplying the separation elasticity by negative two
does not correctly calculate the Lw. Let 
 represent a parameter that measures the inverse growth
rate of the particular rm. If 
 < 1 the rm is expanding, if 
 > 1 the rm is contracting, and if

 = 1 the rm's employment is constant. As shown, relaxing the assumption that 
 = 1 allows us
to derive a generalized relationship between labor elasticity of supply to the rm, the elasticity of
recruits to the rm, and the elasticity of separations from the rm.20
Consider the dynamic equation relating employment this year to employment last year. We
substitute for Lt 1, however we relax the assumption of employment being constant between periods
by introducing our 
 term,
Lt = [1   s(wt)]Lt 1 + R(wt) = [1   s(wt)]
Lt + R(wt):
20In practice, 
 could be computed using either the change between t   1 and t or the change between t and t +1.
Because the choice of using next or previous period is arbitrary, we choose to use an average of both. Specically, we
nd the ratio of employment between the pervious and succeeding calendar year and take the quartic root of this to




1   [1   s(wt)]

: (11)
Taking logs and simplifying, we have
ln(Lt) = ln(R(wt))   ln(1 + s(wt)
   
):
Dierentiating the above equation and multiplying by w we have













We can see above that there is now a more complex relationship between changes in wages and
changes in labor supply to the rm. We have found the eect through separations.
Our challenge now is to nd R in terms of s. To do this, we turn to the denition of the
recruitment elasticity and then to the search model. The elasticity of recruitment with respect to





Under the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, the recruitment function is given by




where Ru is the amount of recruits that are hired from unemployment,  is the job oer arrival
rate, f(w) is the density wage oers. Thus,
R0(w) = f(w)L(w): (14)












Last, we must consider the separations side of the Burdett and Mortensen model in order to
nd the relationship between R and s. Separations in this model are given by
s(w) =  + [1   F(w)];
where  is the exogenous job destruction rate,  is the job oer arrival rate and F(w) the distribution
of wage oers. The derivative of the separation function with respect to the wage is then
s0(w) =  f(w): (17)
36Therefore by combining equation (16) and (17) the elasticity of recruitment is
R =
 ws0(w)





1   (1   s(w))

: (18)
Finally, by substituting equation (18) into equation (12), the elasticity of labor supply with
respect to wage can be identied through the separation elasticity of wage, s, the separation rate,
s(w), and rate of expansion or contraction of the rm, 
. We nd that
Lw =  (1 + 
)s
s(w)
1   (1   s(w))

:
This derived adjustment is consistent with Manning (2003) as the equation collapses to Lw =
 2s when employment is constant over time (
 = 1). Note that the lower bound on s(w) is
determined by 
. As R(w)  0, then s(w)  1   1

.
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